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SYLOS LABINI AND SCHUMPETER’S BUSINESS CYCLES. UNPUBLISHED NOTES 
 
 
 
 
I. THE YOUNG SYLOS LABINI AND SCHUMPETER AT HARVARD 
 
Paolo Sylos Labini was born in Rome on October 30, 1920 and died on the December 7, 
2005. After graduating in 1942, Sylos Labini won a fellowship in the USA. After an initial 
period in Chicago, he moved to Harvard, where he was able to attend Schumpeter’s 
course from 1948 to 1950.1 Sylos reported that not only was he strongly influenced by 
Schumpeter’s work,2 but that he was also highly impressed by his personality. The Italian 
observed that Schumpeter was a genius and, like all geniuses, intimately lonely, with a 
dramatic personality.  
 I first met Sylos Labini on December 3, 2002, when I went to Rome to discuss my thesis 
with him on the intellectual heritage of Schumpeter in the Sylos Labini’s work. During this 
first meeting, I learned more about how Labini’s passion for economics and for the 
concept of innovation had developed. 
 In fact, the Italian economist’s first true passion was innovations. After graduating, the 
young Sylos Labini wanted to study engineering, in order to become an inventor. But 
there was war, and Sylos’ father thought this branch of study too long and expensive. So 
Paolo decided to enroll in the law program, which would be cheaper and shorter. But he 
had no passion for studying law and dedicated his spare time to studying mathematics 
and economics.  
 When the time came to choose the subject of his thesis, Sylos Labini decided to work on 
innovation, under the guidance of Professor Papi.3 Searching for the bibliographical 
material, the young scholar was astonished to find so little literature in a period of such 
great innovation. He found that the only important work on this subject was Schumpeter 
(1911).4 This was the first scientific contact between Sylos Labini and the Austrian 
economist. 
 It would be interesting to study the influence and connections between Sylos Labini 
and Schumpeter in their entirety, but this is not the aim of this paper. I will set out rather 
to summarize all these points, and then focus on a specific one. While he was at Harvard, 
Sylos Labini read Schumpeter (1939b)5 and decided to write down his impressions before 
giving them to his former professor (February 1949), who discussed them over a couple of 
lessons. These notes are still unpublished, and Sylos gave me a copy at our first meeting, 
saying that it was time to publish them. He spoke about these notes in Roncaglia (1988, pp. 
135–139).  
 In the first part of this paper, I will make some comments on the connections between 
                                                 
1 When the 75 years old Taussig retired in 1935, Schumpeter took over the famous economic theory class for 
postgraduates.  
2 «I studied at Harvard with Schumpeter, in 1949, just a while before his death, being affected – hoping in the 
right way – by him. Therefore my vision on innovations is not simply economic, but social too». Sylos Labini 
(1989, p. 31) (translated by Carmelo Ferlito). 
3 Thesis title is Gli effetti economici delle invenzioni sulla organizzazione industriale. 
4 At the beginning of the 1940s this book had only been partially translated into Italian, edited by Giovanni 
Demaria. See Demaria (1932). The first complete Italian translation was published in the 1971. 
5 Losing many dioptres, he told me. 
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the scientific works of the authors. In particular, I will analyze their perspective on market 
theory and interest theory.  
 I will then briefly discuss the content of the unpublished notes, focusing on the critical 
aspects of Schumpeter’s business cycle theory to which Labini draws attention. 
 In the last part, I will present Sylos Labini’s business cycle theory, an interesting mix of 
Schumpeterian, Keynesian and Marxian elements.  
 Finally, I will provide the content of the notes. 
  
 
II. SCHUMPETER AND SYLOS LABINI: NOTES ON A SCIENTIFIC RELATIONSHIP 
 
 The link between Schumpeter and Labini is immediately evident upon reading their 
major books. Sylos Labini may, perhaps, be considered the only Italian economist to have 
used a general Schumpeterian approach to economics, albeit in his own way. In particular, 
Sylos Labini’s thought can be seen as an original mixture of Marxian, Schumpeterian and 
Keynesian elements. The comparison between Marx and Schumpeter was very important 
for Sylos Labini,6 and many other Italian economists have stressed this point.7 I should 
here briefly recall that Sylos, like Schumpeter and Marx, was convinced that capitalism 
would be substituted by socialism.8 But there are many other points of contact between the 
two economists. 
 First, I should point out that, in some ways, Sylos Labini starts where Schumpeter 
ends. Schumpeter (1942), the last economic text written by the Austrian, deals with the life 
of the capitalist system during its last phase, in which oligopolistic firms rule the scene. 
Sylos Labini (1956), the Italian’s first important book, tackles the same problem, admitting 
that the oligopolistic system is the new face of capitalism.9 But the link between 
Schumpeter and Sylos becomes more evident when reading that this birth of the 
oligopolistic system within capitalism is no accident, but a natural evolution of reality, 
caused by the mechanisms of innovation and competition (in Schumpeterian terms).10  
 Related to this is the central role of innovation and technology.11 In Schumpeter’s 
opinion, the innovative process dies out with “trustified” capitalism, while Sylos Labini 
states rather that big firms, and public firms too, can play an important role in stimulating 
the innovative process through large investments in research and development.12 
Moreover, Sylos Labini emphasizes the new life that small firms can experience in the 
                                                 
6 See Sylos Labini (1954). 
7 See, in particular, Vitello (1965), Egidi (1981), Tronti (1983), Salvati (1983), Messori (1983), Gattei (1984), 
Bellofiore (1984), Zagari (1986). For a general perspective of Sylos Labini’s thought on Marx see Sylos Labini 
(1994). 
8 Sylos Labini (1984a, p. 53 of the Italian edition). 
9 Lachmann (1954, p. 134), states that one of the three major events we see in the field of economic thought in 
the 1933-1953 period is «the evolution of various theories of mixed market forms, like monopolitistic and 
imperfect competition». And he adds (p. 137) that «the most interesting problems in the theory of mixed 
market forms arise in connection with the question of whether, to what extent, and, if at all, in what 
sequence the various market forms can be said to succeed each other in time. In this context the “inevitability 
of monopoly”, or perhaps oligopoly, calls for particular attention». 
10 Sylos Labini (1956, pp. 2-3, 8-9, 11-12). 
11 «Technological innovations are not simply an important aid for economic development process: in the 
long run they are even a necessary condition of such a process». Sylos Labini (1992, p. 5) (translated by 
Carmelo Ferlito). 
12 Sylos Labini (1956, pp. 35-36 and 146-147) and Sylos Labini (1990, pp. 447-449). 
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shadow of big ones, helping and cooperating with them.13 
 Another point regards the interest rate. Before meeting Schumpeter, Sylos Labini tried 
to build up a dynamic theory of interest (in Sylos Labini [1948]).14 The same attempt can be 
found in Schumpeter (1908, pp. 332–46), Schumpeter (1911, pp. 173–223) and Schumpeter 
(1939a, pp. 152–59). Schumpeter does not agree with Böhm-Bawerk’s concept of interest as 
a measure of temporal preference. He associates interest with innovation, profit and 
creation of credit by banks.15 Sylos Labini’s vision is very similar: he speaks of interest as a 
“tax” which entrepreneurs pay banks for supplying the capital, necessary for the 
innovative process.16 Moreover, Labini states that money is created by banks, agreeing 
entirely with Schumpeter’s view on the matter.17 In a phone call to me on April 22, 2003, 
Labini stressed how close he was to Schumpeter even before meeting him. When at 
Harvard, Labini presented this paper to the Austrian, who was very enthusiastic, finding 
it an exact demonstration of his interest theory.18 Schumpeter did his best to get the paper 
published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, but died before he could do so. Sylos 
Labini, considering himself too young to knock on the door of such an important 
publication,19 refrained from any such attempt. 
 Another important aspect of this link is economic theory and the role of history. From 
this point of view too, a number of connections between the two authors can be found. 
Specifically, both Schumpeter and Sylos Labini stress the link between theory and history. 
Schumpeter’s passion for history is renowned, particularly if one considers the “old” 
Schumpeter.20 Thanks to his History, Schumpeter reaches his full methodological growth,21 
clearly defining the tools an economist must use for his work. According to the Austrian, 
the scientific economist can be identified by his mastery of approaches, relating to three 
specific groups that together serve as the foundation of economic analysis: history, 
statistics, and theory.22 He then adds that, were he forced to choose among one of the three 
approaches, he would doubtless opt for history.23 Actually, as it appears in his Cycles, he 
had already lingered on the combination history/statistics as a focal point, outlining his 
predilection for economic history; this step would be then completed by his History. In 
Schumpeter’s opinion, history in general (social, political, cultural), economic history, and 
history of industry are essential in understanding all problems. All other methods, the 
statistical and theoretical ones, must be subordinated to historical understanding. 
                                                 
13 Sylos Labini (1993a, pp. 224-227). 
14 Sylos Labini suggested we read this old paper. He took up the arguments of the article in Sylos Labini 
(1998b) and Sylos Labini (2003). 
15 Schumpeter (1911, pp. 173-175). 
16 Sylos Labini (1948, pp. 428-429). 
17 Sylos Labini (1992, p. 25). 
18 Schumpeter’s unaccomplished dream was to write a brilliant book on interest and money. His monetary 
treatise was published after he died, but it cannot be considered a masterpiece. See Schumpeter (1970) and 
Schumpeter (1996). When he was at Harvard, Sylos Labini asked to Schumpeter about his book on monetary 
theory and when he would finish it, but Schumpeter answered: «My friend, I guess I’ll finish it in heaven, 
with the help of celestial cherubs; or perhaps, as it is more probable, in hell, with the imps, led by 
Barbariccia». 
19 For a complete explanation of Sylos Labini’s thought on relations between money, credit, interest and 
economic development, see Sylos Labini (1992, pp. 17-27). 
20 Schumpeter (1954, pp. 15-30). See also De Vecchi (2002). 
21 Schumpeter (1954, pp. 15-30). 
22 Schumpeter (1954, pp. 15-16). 
23 Schumpeter (1954, p. 16). 
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Schumpeter even considers them useless, if outside the field of history.24 In his Business 
Cycles, we read that the historical approach to the business cycles issue is so fundamental 
that 
 
 the ultimate goal is simply a reasoned ( = conceptually clarified) history, not of crises only, nor of 
cycles or waves, but of the economic process in all its aspects and bearing to which theory merely 
supplies some tools and schemata, and statistics merely part of the material.25  
 
 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 237) adds that such historical analysis, with the purpose of 
understanding the cyclic trend as characteristic of the capitalist progress, must at least 
consider the last 250 years. Therefore, Schumpeter means to show the capitalist period as a 
whole economic process shaped by history, following the example of what Spiethoff 
meant by wirtschaftstil. This idea is a synthesis of the methodenstreit. According to the last 
representative of the German Historical School, an economic analysis can be achieved, but 
it must refer to a clear-cut historical and economic period, marked by distinctive elements, 
allowing the identification of a specific “economic style.” Capitalism is one of these styles, 
marked by cyclic trend; Schumpeter wants to focus on capitalism with the aid of historical 
research. This is what Schumpeter meant by the creation of an economic theory shaped by 
history.  
 Sylos stated that every theory is historically conditioned. Math is a useful instrument, 
but every starting point has to be connected with historical reality.26 Moreover, like 
Schumpeter, Sylos believed that an effective theory had to be a dynamic one. And a 
dynamic theory is compatible with historical analysis.27 
In a later text, Labini (2005, p. 182) stated that when elaborating an economic theory, he 
would think about a method using historically conditioned models. In the same way as 
Marx, Labini (2005, pp. 182–83), stressed that the business cycle is clearly historically 
conditioned. It could be interesting to compare this approach to the methodological view 
presented by Werner Sombart28 and Arthur Spiethoff.29 
First of all, Labini explains that in any science, a proposition can be interpreted only if 
it is, at the same time, logically correct and somehow relevant. That is to say, connected to 
reality.30 We recall here the modern formal models. Labini notes that it may appear that, 
since economics is a social science, an historical approach is to be preferred to a 
mathematical one. However, he warns us, this is not the case, for mathematics and history 
do not have to be considered antithetical. Of course the requirements for the research must 
be found within historical reality, but mathematics can turn out to be a useful 
reinforcement tool. There must be interaction between theoretical analysis and empirical 
research. What he criticizes is the mere creation of formal models produced without a 
connection to reality.31 We may now think there are some differences with Schumpeter’s 
methodology, considering that the Austrian economist always promoted the use of 
mathematics and econometrics, practically being obsessed by them. However, we also 
                                                 
24 Schumpeter (1939a, pp. 53-54). 
25 Schumpeter (1939b, p. 220). 
26 Sylos Labini (1992, pp. VI-XII) and Sylos Labini (2005, p. 189). 
27 Sylos Labini (1992, pp. VI-VIII). See also Sylos Labini (2002, pp. 69-70). 
28 See Sombart (1929). 
29 See Spiethoff (1952), Spiethoff (1953), Spiethoff (1970) and the first part of Spiethoff (1925). 
30 Sylos Labini (1992, p. VII). 
31 Sylos Labini (1992, p. VII). 
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know that Schumpeter never actually used mathematics to create his models, thus 
favoring a wider approach so as to unite a wide sociological and historical vision with the 
rigors of economic analysis. The faith Schumpeter had in mathematics was more of a 
theoretical than an actual kind.  
Moreover, Labini can only see the analysis as dynamic, opposing the static neoclassical 
approach prevailing in his time. A dynamic analysis can be seen in agreement with a 
historical analysis.32 Therefore, within economic analysis, all steps must be taken in 
reference to a specific social reality and the results so obtained must refer to it, with no 
demand that the time period be extended.33 Such an approach leads Labini to consider 
cultural and economical phenomena as interdependent, with no dominance of facts of the 
one kind over facts of the other kind, as happens with the Marxist theory.34 
There is a last aspect of the connection I would like to point out, which shows a great 
difference between the two economists. We can say that Sylos Labini was normative in his 
economics. We cannot say the same in regard to Schumpeter. I have already emphasized 
Schumpeter’s desire to keep from passing any judgment, whether a positive or a negative 
one, each time he evaluates a scenario. Reading Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, we 
seem to find a “worried” Schumpeter; despite his trying to be unbiased he cannot hide his 
gloominess due to the disappearance of the system whose main character, the 
businessman, he had described in apologetic terms. The situation is different for Labini. 
We can see how dedicated he was, above all late in his life, to fighting political and social 
fights. This kind of commitment is very different from Schumpeter’s ministerial 
involvement. Whereas Schumpeter aimed at value-free scientific considerations, the Italian 
economist tended to relate economic thought to socio-political preferences. For instance, 
Labini assesses the development process as good, while underlining the risks embedded 
in it.35 Whereas Schumpeter sees the economic theorist as a “narrator” of reality as it is, 
without judging what he is researching, Labini’s opinion is that the economist, while 
analyzing the different situations, must consider all the effects deriving from the 
description of such situations. 
 The last point pertains to business cycles: both Schumpeter and Labini believed that 
the cycle is the real form of economic development in a capitalistic system. Capitalistic 
development and business cycles are inseparable.36 This point brings us to the main focus 
of the paper, but I will leave a detailed analysis of Labini’s business cycle theory, as related 
to Schumpeter’s thought, to the fourth section. 
 
 
III. COMMENTS ON SYLOS LABINI’S UNPUBLISHED NOTES 
 
1. SCHUMPETER’S BUSINESS CYCLES: A SUMMARY 
 
I shall now discuss the contents of the comments Labini wrote on Schumpeter’s 
Business Cycles point by point. First of all, it is necessary to briefly summarize 
Schumpeter’s cycle theory. 
                                                 
32 Sylos Labini (1992, p. VII) and Sylos Labini (2002, pp. 69-70). 
33 Sylos Labini (1989, p. 99) and Sylos Labini (1993a, pp. 124-125). 
34 Forcellini (1983, p. 54) and Sylos Labini (1984a, pp. 37 and 89). 
35 Sylos Labini (1954, pp. 12-14) and Sylos Labini (1984a, pp. 37 and 89). 
36 This is a transverse position, which, from Marx, touches many economic schools. We have to think, i.e., 
about the position of Spiethoff (1925), Schumpeter (1939a) and Lachmann (1956, pp. 110-112). 
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According to Schumpeter, the wave motion (cycle) is the pattern taken on by economic 
development under capitalism. But assuming we start from a system in static equilibrium, 
what sets the cycle in motion? Schumpeter identifies certain causes which can be found 
both inside and outside the economic system; the economist cannot observe or analyze the 
external causes (wars, earthquakes, etc.), while the internal causes are typically economic 
factors and may thus be examined by the economic scientist.37 Schumpeter makes three 
key “approximations” in his business cycle theory. 
First, we assume a perfect static balance, where the conditions of perfect competition 
are valid, where the population is steady, where there are no savings, and we have all the 
requirements for the circular flow38 (Schumpeter calls such a balanced situation a 
“theoretical norm”).39 We also assume that, in the model of a capitalist society, there is 
always the possibility of new combinations of the factors of production, and that people 
are able to and ready to carry them out (motivated by the prospect of profit). 
 
Some people, then, conceive and work out with varying promptness plans of innovations associated 
with varying (and ideally correct) anticipations of profits, and set about struggling with the obstacles 
incident to doing a new unfamiliar thing [...] Conforming to previous considerations, we suppose that he 
founds a new firm, constructs a new plant, and orders new equipment from existing firms. The requisite 
funds—his entrance ticket to the social store of means of production—he borrows from a bank. On the 
balance acquired by so doing he draws, either in order to hand the checks to other people who furnish 
him with goods and services, or in order to get currency with which to pay for these supplies. Under our 
assumptions he withdraws, by his bids for producers’ goods, the quantities of them he needs from the 
uses which they served before. Then other entrepreneurs follow, after them still others in increasing 
number, in the path of innovation, which becomes progressively smoothed for successors by 
accumulating experience and vanishing obstacles.40  
 
What can we see from the explication of the above? First of all, Schumpeter assumes 
that businessmen spend their funds right away, with the exception of a minimal stock. 
Second of all, without unused resources (due to the hypothesis of the circular flow), the 
prices of the factors of production will rise, and monetary incomes and interest rates will 
behave the same way. Thirdly, incomes will also increase, in correspondence to the 
entrepreneurs’ expenses in investment goods. Workers’ expenses will rise as well, as long 
as they receive a higher salary and in correspondence to the expenses of those people 
receiving all of these increased payments.41 Nevertheless, so far, we can suppose there has 
not been any increase in production yet.42 This is what happens until the first 
entrepreneur’s system starts working.43  
 
Then the scene begins to change and a new business situation emerges, characteristically differing 
from the one we glanced at, but not less easy to understand. The new commodities—let us say, new 
consumers’ goods—flow into the market. They are, since everything turns out according to expectation, 
readily taken up at exactly those prices at which the entrepreneur expected to sell them. […] A stream of 
receipts will hence flow into the entrepreneur’s account, at a rate sufficient to repay during the lifetime 
of the plant and equipment originally acquired, the total debt incurred plus interest, and to leave a profit 
for the entrepreneur. […T]he new firms, getting successively into working order and throwing their 
                                                 
37 Schumpeter (1939a, pp. 96-97). 
38 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 161). 
39 Schumpeter (1939a, pp. 62-70). 
40 Schumpeter (1939b, pp. 130-131). 
41 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 161). 
42 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 163). 
43 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 163). 
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products into the market of consumers' goods, increase the total output of consumers’ goods which had 
been previously reduced.44 
 
Such new goods, in Schumpeter’s opinion, enter the market at too fast a pace to be 
absorbed with no shocks. In particular, the old companies, the chasers, face different 
scenarios, which do not follow a predetermined rule. Some get into new scenarios. Some 
others die, not being able to fit in. Still others still look for a new purpose.45 Nevertheless, 
even the driving company’s competitive lead tends to decrease. As the products enter the 
market and the importance of debt repayment rises, entrepreneurial activity diminishes to 
the point of finally disappearing.46 As soon as the entrepreneurial expansion stops, 
moving the system away from its balanced position, the system itself struggles again 
towards a new equilibrium. We now start seeing the first outline of a cyclic scheme.47  
 
When we look at the skeleton, we behold the picture of a distinct process in time which displays 
functional relations between its constituent parts and is logically self contained. This process of 
economic change or evolution, moreover, goes on in units separated from each other by neighborhoods 
of equilibrium. Each of those units, in turn, consists of two distinct phases, during the first of which the 
system, under the impulse of entrepreneurial activity, draws away from an equilibrium position, and 
during the second of which it draws toward another equilibrium position. 
Each of those two phases is characterized by a definite succession of phenomena. The readers need 
only recall what they are in order to make the discovery that they are precisely the phenomena which he 
associates with “prosperity” and “recession”: our model reproduces, by its mere working, that very 
sequence of events which we observe in the course of those fluctuations in economic life, which have come to be 
called business cycles and which, translated into the language of diagrams, present the picture of an 
undulating or wavelike movement in absolute figures or rates of change.48  
 
We can observe the following from Schumpeter at this point: 
- progress makes the economic mechanism unstable and makes it move in a cyclic 
trend49 
- prosperity moves away from balance, while recession is a rapprochement. This 
appears to be far from the usual meanings.50 
- nothing in the theory gives any indication that cycles will be regular. The duration 
mostly depends on the potency of innovation, therefore the cyclic process is 
structurally irregular.51 
Herein is the reasoning leading us to the analysis of the second approximation cycle. If 
innovations are embedded in new plants and facilities, the expenses for consumer goods 
will rise as fast as the expenses for investment goods. They will both expand starting from 
those points in the system where they had previously generated an impact, and they will 
create that set of economic situations which we call prosperity. Hence we note two 
phenomena. Firstly, the old companies will react to this situation, and secondly, many of 
them will “speculate.” Those willing to take advantage of the situation will act assuming 
that the observed change must carry on forever; such conduct will anticipate prosperity, 
                                                 
44 Schumpeter (1939b, p. 133). 
45 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 165). 
46 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 166). 
47 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 170). 
48 Schumpeter (1939b, p. 138). 
49 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 170). 
50 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 174). 
51 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 175). 
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thus creating a boom.52 This way, credit will not be simply an investors’ prerogative, and 
deposits will be created to fund the general expansion. Every loan generates another, so 
that a series of price increases will begin. At this stage, we see transactions becoming 
possible just with an increase in prices, whether actual or expected. We now have, in the 
cyclic process, the introduction of a secondary wave, whose effects overlap those of the 
primary wave.53 The consequences of the secondary wave are even more noticeable than 
the first one, as observing a growing fire is easier than observing the match lighting it. Due 
to this difficulty, we often identify speculation as the cause of the cycle, while the 
innovation causing speculation is disregarded because it is harder to single out.54  
Even in the secondary expansion, the end comes from a turning point of the process. 
Any state of prosperity entails a period of failures which, besides eliminating obsolete 
companies not capable of readjustment, also determines a painful process of readjustment 
in prices, quantities and values, as the new equilibrium emerges.55 In the secondary 
prosperity, risky, deceitful, or unlucky enterprises also take shape, and they will not 
withstand a recession. The speculative position implies a lot of unsustainable elements, 
which will collapse after the slightest deterioration in value of the other collateral 
elements. Therefore, a large proportion of the current business investments will suffer a 
loss as soon as prices fall, and they will indeed fall, due to the primary process. A part of 
the debt structure will also collapse. If, in this case, panic and crisis ensue, further 
adjustments will be necessary: values fall and every decline induces the following decline. 
For some time, the pessimistic expectation will play a critical part, but it must be endorsed 
by objective elements, otherwise it will not last.56  
Now we see the outline of a four-phase cyclic scheme (recalling that in the first 
approximation we only had prosperity and recession): prosperity, recession, depression, 
recovery:  
 
Now that class of facts [the secondary wave], whenever it is of sufficient quantitative significance, has 
an important bearing upon our schema. As long as we took no account of it, we had only two phases—
Prosperity and Recession—in every unit of the cyclical process, but now we shall understand that under 
pressure of the breakdown of the secondary wave and of the bearish anticipation which will be induced 
by it, our process will generally, although not necessarily, outrun (as a rule, also miss) the neighborhood 
of equilibrium toward which it was heading and enter upon a new phase, absent in our first 
approximation, which will be characterized by what we shall refer to as Abnormal Liquidation, that is to 
say, by a downward revision of values and a shrinkage of operations that reduce them, often quite 
erratically, below their equilibrium amounts. While in recession a mechanism is at work to draw the 
system toward equilibrium, new disequilibrium develops now: the system again draws away from a 
neighborhood of equilibrium as it did during prosperity, but under the influence of a different impulse. 
For this phase we shall reserve the term of Depression. But when depression has run its course, the 
system starts to feel its way back to a new neighborhood of equilibrium. This constitutes our fourth 
phase. We will call it Recovery or Revival.57 
 
Dropping the hypothesis that the examined innovation is the first one in history, we 
must conclude that every observable and historically placed cyclic phase brings with it the 
effects of the previous cycles, and will influence the following phases. We must also 
                                                 
52 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 177). 
53 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 178). 
54 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 178). 
55 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 180). 
56 Schumpeter (1939a, p. 181). 
57 Schumpeter (1939b, p. 149). 
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understand that perfect competition is not a frequent phenomenon within the ordinary 
cyclic trend. Instead, the entrepreneurial push is based on a world in which imperfect 
competition reigns. Innovation itself changes the market, creating for the innovator a 
competitive advantage that forces the others to adjust. In the first phase, the costs saved by 
the innovator allow him price-searching status which is not seen under the conditions of 
perfect competition. According to Schumpeter, the only real competition is the one 
established between the emerging new and the old struggling to survive. This competition 
is to neoclassical perfect competition (a mass of identical companies producing 
homogeneous goods) what a bombing is to the pressure necessary to break open a door.58 
The third approximation originates from Schumpeter’s argument that innovations are 
the source of cyclic flows. Thinking them as a consistent wave motion is impossible, 
because the periods of gestation and effects absorbed by the economic system are not the 
same for all innovations undertaken at any given time.59 Therefore Schumpeter sees three 
simultaneous wave motions, alternating within the capitalistic dynamic. This does not 
mean we won’t be able to find others, such as Kondratieff, Juglar and Kitchin cycles. The 
Kondratieff cycle is completed in 50–60 years, the Juglar cycle in 7–10 years, and the 
Kitchin cycle in 2–3 years.60  
In his Economic Cycles, Schumpeter thoroughly analyzes some Kondratieff cycles he 
detected (incidentally showing his vast knowledge of economic history):  
 
- 1786–1842: First Kondratieff cycle connected to the growing use of hydro power for 
industrial purposes61 
- 1843–97: Second Kondratieff cycle connected to railway growth62 
- 1898–1913: Third Kondratieff cycle connected to electrification.63 (This study stops in 
1913 due to wartime.) 
  
Now that Schumpeter’s economic cycle theory is summarized, Sylos Labini’s ideas can 
be properly introduced. 
 
2. TYPES OF INNOVATIONS, GROWTH AND EVOLUTION 
First of all, Labini considers one of the types Schumpeter indicates as innovations: the 
opening up of new sources of supply and that of new markets. According to Labini, it is 
not true that the opening up of new sources of supply always implies a new production 
function; we can imagine the opening up of new lands with the same degree of fertility as 
the already cultivated ones. In this case we would not have a new production function and 
no innovation would occur. Moreover, the Italian economist admits (Schumpeter perhaps 
not) that firms could increase production volume with the same technical coefficients, 
without varying the production function. As Labini explained later,64 it is misleading to 
associate the concept of innovation with the introduction of a new production function 
and, in his opinion; this sentence was just a form of verbal obeisance to neoclassical 
language paid by Schumpeter. In any case, continues Labini, the concept of innovation is 
                                                 
58 Cfr. Schumpeter (1942). 
59 Schumpeter (1939a, pp. 195-196). 
60 Schumpeter (1939a, pp. 197-198). 
61 Schumpeter (1939a, pp. 237-261). 
62 Schumpeter (1939a, pp. 263-312). 
63 Schumpeter (1939a, pp. 312-345). 
64 See Roncaglia (1988, p. 137). 
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linked to that of a new production function and the production function is linked to the 
introduction of a new technical method. 
 The next point is particularly important. Schumpeter is known to distinguish between 
growth and evolution (or development), the latter entailing innovation. According to 
Schumpeter, in the circular flow, growth alone exists but not evolution. Labini agrees with 
the fact that growth by itself is incapable of generating the business cycle, but, as regards 
the opposition of the two terms, he is, maybe, more Schumpeterian than Schumpeter: in 
Labini’s opinion, growth without evolution (or innovation) is inadmissible. He writes that 
“’Growth’ is conceivable without innovation only in the (exceptional) case of opening up 
of new lands with the same degree of fertility than the cultivated ones and with which it is 
possible to produce with the same coefficients.” This is because of the law of diminishing 
returns of land (in the Ricardian sense) and the scarcity of natural resources. So, if we 
want to expand production at constant average costs, innovations are necessary. Labini 
took up this concept in his subsequent books. For example, in Labini (1956, pp. 132–33), 
we read, 
 
 But the other kind of investment, which associated with a change in technical coefficients, is of 
primary importance—so much that it is the determining factor of economic development. Unless the 
technical coefficients change, economic development cannot go on indefinitely, if only because of the 
direct or indirect effects of the diminishing returns of land; the overall rate of increase in production 
would be bound to diminish and, in the long run, would tend toward zero. Development can go on 
indefinitely only if technical coefficients change not merely occasionally but systematically, that is, as a 
result of a series of innovating investment. Such investment consists primarily of new and improved 
machines, which have the effect of lowering the labor coefficient and which, for this reason, may well 
generate technological unemployment. 
 
 And in Labini (1984a, p. 81), the theme is reaffirmed.  
 
 If we take into account the tendency of diminishing returns from agriculture and mining, we are 
bound to recognize that, with unchanging methods of production, the rate of increase of the social 
product in the long run would necessarily tend to zero. This means that in the long run technological 
progress is not simply the main factor of economic growth: it is the necessary condition.65 
 
 Labini suggests that those innovations which do not entail the construction of new 
plant requiring a great amount of time and outlay (the ones which Schumpeter does not 
consider) could also be included in the analysis of growth. 
 Moreover, Labini classifies innovations from the money cost perspective. He 
distinguishes between innovations “that allow to expand production at constant average 
costs and innovations that bring about a diminution of average costs.” In Labini’s opinion 
only the second type of innovations could give rise to the competition-reducing process, 
and thereby to the cycle.  
 A crucial criticism is connected with the concept of credit creation in an economy with 
growth and without development. Labini, stating that in this case credit creation does not 
imply inflation, adds that perhaps in such a system credit creation is not conceivable. In 
fact, credit creation is based on the payment of interest, but the latter arises from profit 
opportunities which are not conceivable without innovation, and thus development. So, to 
sum up, admitting the existence of credit expansion is not possible, when opportunities of 
profit and innovation are not present. This means that the possibility of a non-inflationary 
                                                 
65 See also Sylos Labini (1981, p. 41) and Sylos Labini (1989, p. 32). 
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credit expansion is self-contradictory. In this coherent analysis Labini is close to Mises’s 
thought. However, that thinking appears to have faded in Labini’s later work. In Labini 
(1992, p. 25) we find a change in his course; Labini even states that the creation of credit 
can be used in an anti-inflationary mode. He claims that there may be a productive 
expansion with steady prices if, when the product flow rises, a proportional monetary 
means flow rises also. The creation of credit finds its basis in increased production, which 
forms some kind of alternative counterbalance to the increased savings.66 Here the 
relationship among savings, credit and economic expansion is diametrically opposed to 
the Austrian paradigm.  
 
3. DECLINE OF CAPITALISM 
 We may further consider the relationship between the upswing phase of the cycle and 
general welfare. Labini says that the arguments made by Schumpeter suggest the existence 
of an inverse relationship between the two, and he seems a little skeptical on this point. 
Two other doubts relate to social problems. According to Schumpeter, democracy works 
better in periods of declining prices; Labini states that there may be some consequences. In 
fact, during a period of declining prices, capitalists might attempt to maintain their income 
levels through monopolistic barriers, while, for the same reasons, workers would try to 
preserve their wage levels by fighting against wage cuts. Thus, we might observe, during 
a phase of declining prices, an increase in social struggles.  
 According to Labini, this matter is related to the decline of capitalism. It seems to me 
that Labini, in his questions, agrees with Schumpeter, when the Austrian states that 
“capitalism produces by its mere working a social atmosphere... that is hostile to it, and 
this atmosphere, in turn, produces policies which do not allow it to function.” Labini 
makes two points that would seem to confirm this. The dynamics of capitalism breeds a 
trend of unemployment during the depression, but the power of working classes and 
workers’ unions is increasing in capitalist countries, so, during depressions, these two 
facts could lead to the generation of anti-capitalistic economic policies, bringing about 
structural changes in the system. Still there is a great difference between Labini and 
Schumpeter’s patterns. While the Italian focuses on strictly economic factors, connected to 
the genesis of depressions within the area of the economic cycle, Schumpeter’s analysis 
has a wider quality, sociological, socio-historical, outside the spectrum of pristine 
economics. Such vision is not seen in his Business Cycles, but in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, written between 1938 and 1941, is 
undoubtedly his most famous effort. Although the first edition (1942) was only known to a 
small number of people, the second one (1947) was very successful. The text, opening with 
a multifaceted analysis of Marxist thinking,67 revolves around two crucial questions: “Can 
capitalism survive?”68 and, “Can socialism work?”69 Schumpeter answers negatively to the 
first question, but he argues that the end of capitalism will be due to non-economic causes. 
In his opinion there is a hostile attitude within the bourgeois society when it comes to 
capitalism. This hostility is fomented by the increasing number of intellectuals, as basically 
all of them are against capitalism. According to Schumpeter, intellectuals are not a class 
themselves, but they like controlling other classes and explaining to workers what they 
                                                 
66 Sylos Labini (1992, p. 26). 
67 Schumpeter (1942, pp. 3-56). 
68 Schumpeter (1942, pp. 59-169). 
69 Schumpeter (1942, pp. 173-227). 
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should think. The analysis led Schumpeter to believe that demoralization was spreading 
within the capitalist society. Schumpeter saw a middle class lacking in vitality and 
resigned to defeat. The middle class was disenchanted and, in Schumpeter’s opinion, this 
would to lead to the maturation of socialism. But the transformation would not necessarily 
be a short one: there could be a moment when capitalism would prove incapable of both 
dying and surviving.  
 In Schumpeter’s mind the decline of capitalism is also connected to the decline of the 
pure entrepreneurial role, typical of capitalism’s first phase, which portrayed the 
entrepreneur as a heroic figure mastering the scene. In his opinion, capitalism was 
changing, leaving greater room to big firms and state companies, which were unable to 
give capitalism the innovative push vital to its survival. Labini took, over time, a different 
stand. First of all, he believed that a virtuous cooperation between small and big 
companies could be established, on the basis of innovation.70 In particular, he claimed we 
are in the presence of a mechanism of vertical integration; according to this mechanism, 
small companies create innovative processes, which will be continued and developed by 
research facilities of the big firms. The dynamic innovations of small companies create a 
virtuous competition and a stimulus for big firms. Therefore, Labini began his analysis of 
the development of oligopolistic capitalism where Schumpeter had stopped. Though he 
did not agree with his master’s pessimistic vision, he re-launched the centrality of the 
innovative process within a completely changed economic context.  
 
4. QUANTITY OF MONEY, SAVING AND INTEREST 
 Section II is the most important of the notes. Labini stresses that in this section there are 
three crucial points.71 First of all, the concept of quantity of money. Schumpeter writes that it 
is impossible to speak of a quantity of money in the sense in which we can speak of the 
quantity of a commodity, adding that the distinction between velocity and quantity may 
become blurred. Labini agrees that we cannot strictly talk about quantity of money, as we 
talk of quantity referring to any other goods. But he wonders whether such an idea is 
useless under a scientific point of view. Labini says that banks’ reserves are not money 
and cannot be used as money, so we can distinguish between velocity and quantity. 
Answering Roncaglia in 198872 and talking to me in 2002, however, Labini admitted that, 
as his studies had progressed, he had come closer to sharing Schumpeter’s interpretation 
on this point. Labini never elaborated, during the course of his scientific activity, on the 
idea of quantity of money, maybe because he decided that it was pointless.  
 The second objection in section II concerns saving. In Labini’s opinion, we cannot deny 
the role of saving as Schumpeter does, at least during periods of crisis. Labini refers, in 
particular, to saving accumulated by banks. It constitutes the banks’ reserves and is very 
important during crises. Accumulated saving is needed by banks to deal with 
bankruptcies and insolvencies, and represents an integration of the deflation process and 
liquidation. If banks’ reserves are insufficient, the central bank has to tackle the crisis with 
injections of money, bringing about a price increase. Labini adds73 that this point is not a 
criticism of Schumpeter’s theory, but an attempt to integrate it explaining the case of a per-
capita income increase caused by rising prices.  
                                                 
70 Sylos Labini (1993b, pp. 269-274). 
71 Roncaglia (1988, p. 138). 
72 Roncaglia (1988, p. 138). 
73 Roncaglia (1988, p. 138). 
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 Finally we reach the point that Labini considers the most interesting74 (II. 3). He starts 
by quoting Schumpeter, when he writes that the cheapness of money (a low interest rate) 
pushes the system towards mechanization. This is a typical neoclassical belief, which 
Schumpeter espouses in his 1939 book. Schumpeter (1939b, p. 123) defines the interest rate 
as a premium on present over future means of payment, or, as we will say, a potiori 
balances. He considers the interest phenomenon to be connected to innovation. As a 
matter of fact, given the previous assertion, for interest to be generated, it is necessary that 
someone place a higher value on current money than on future money. From where can 
this disparity originate? In capitalistic dynamic, as Schumpeter analyzed it, such a 
phenomenon can occur with an innovative effort by the entrepreneur who, if the interest 
rate is low, estimates that profits connected to the innovative process will be sufficient to 
supersede the interest monetary cost. Labini, rather, says that lowering the interest rate 
must be an incentive to expand production, raising demand for all production factors, 
machines and labor. According to Schumpeter this is not admissible. What motivates the 
entrepreneur is not the possibility of increasing production, but the possibility of 
generating a profit. This can be done just with innovation, often marked by 
mechanization. However, in private, Schumpeter, commenting on this point, told Labini: 
“But then you reject an essential part of the traditional [neoclassical] theory!” Labini, in 
Roman dialect and shrugging his shoulders, answered: “Ehn bè….” So Schumpeter simply 
said: “All right, all right.” So the Austrian economist seemed to be aware of a leak within 
his system. Besides, a complete monetary analysis is the missing piece of Schumpeter’s 
theoretical approach and also one major reason for friction with the other Austrian 
economists. We only need to remember how severely he criticizes the distinction between 
the actual interest rate and the natural interest rate, which can be typically found in the 
Wicksell-Mises-Hayek approach.75 As Labini told me, and Roncaglia before me,76 
Schumpeter in The Theory of Economic Development seems much closer to Labini’s thought 
on this point. Labini states that the first attempt to break down this theory (the inverse 
relationship between the interest rate and mechanization) is to be found in Sraffa (1960) 
and the ensuing debate on capital theory.77 His thoughts on this matter are later developed 
in Labini (1988). 
 The last two points of section II are not so interesting, while section III is a list of 
bibliographical suggestions, which Schumpeter may not have appreciated, believing that 
Labini wished to challenge his immense erudition. 
 
 
IV. LABINI’S BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY 
 
 As mentioned previously, Labini’s business cycle theory was strongly influenced by 
Schumpeter. In particular, the Italian economist sees the capitalistic process as a 
relationship between innovation, development and the business cycle.78 For this reason, 
                                                 
74 Roncaglia (1988, p. 138). 
75 Schumpeter (1939a, pp. 156-158). 
76 Roncaglia (1988, p. 139). 
77 Roncaglia (1988, p. 139). 
78 «In our time, therefore, the relationship between scientific progress and technological innovations is 
systematic: we have reached the point where our research and innovations have been institutionalized. 
Productive development continued, through accelerations and temporary downswings (crisis); in other 
words, development went on through cycles. Productive development, business cycles and technological 
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studying this topic means explaining the cycle and development at the same time. Such 
explanation must be centred on the role of investments.79 
 Like Schumpeter, Labini indicates several types of innovation that may generate 
business cycles: production of new goods, changes in production coefficients, and changes 
in the quality of products. 
 Labini then mentions four stages of capitalistic evolution, close to the Schumpeterian 
idea of Kondratieff cycles.80 But the Italian does not want to define them as cycles, 
preferring to associate them with the four industrial revolutions.81 The first one was the 
English Industrial Revolution, which historians date to between 1780 and 1850. During 
this period, the development process was driven by the introduction and diffusion of 
steam power and modern factories. The second revolution, during the second half of the 
19th century, was characterized by the application of steam power to railroads and 
steamboats. During the third, in the first half of the 20th century, there were a variety of 
large scale innovations: electricity, the internal combustion engine, chemistry. In addition, 
other energy sources also appeared: oil and electricity, in addition to coal. There was also 
an expansion of the “public hand” in the economic system. Today, Labini stated, we are 
living in the fourth industrial revolution, dominated by atomic energy and airplanes.82  
 In this regard, Labini does not agree with Schumpeter when the latter states that cycles 
began in the dawn of time. Labini refers to Marx, saying that cyclical movements began 
just after mechanical industry established itself, after the Napoleonic wars.83 Labini adds 
that social, institutional and economic changes influenced the cycle and its features. Until 
the First World War, small firms dominated the scene, so the cycle was more regular and 
an average length of 7–9 years (the Juglar cycle in the Schumpeterian terminology) was 
clearly distinguishable. After the Second World War, the long cycle idea no longer sufficed 
                                                                                                                                                                  
innovations are three aspects of the same process: this is Schumpeter’s perspective». Sylos Labini (1989, p. 
20) (translated by Carmelo Ferlito). See also Sylos Labini (1993a, pp. 121-122) and Sylos Labini (1992, p. 16). 
79  «Thus, investments must be the essential element of such a process, because these must not only have 
an immediate multiplier-effect on consumptions, but, when completed, also have the effect of increasing 
either productive capacity and factors productivity, in particular labour». Sylos Labini (1992, p. 235) 
(translated by Carmelo Ferlito). 
80  Sylos Labini (1993a, p. 115) adds that we can distinguish three main cyclical periods. During each 
period the features of fluctuations differ greatly. At least «three periods need to be distinguished: (1) 1800-
1913, (2) the interwar period and (3) the period starting with the end of the Second World War. The cycles 
observable in the nineteenth century and until the First World War can be called classical business cycles, the 
interwar period was marked more by violent and irregular fluctuations than cycles, and the cycles that can 
be observed after the Second World War can be defined as new business cycles». See also Sylos Labini (2004, 
pp. 92-95). 
81  The «idea of long cycles must be approached with great caution. It may prove to be only analytically 
deceptive, but also dangerous for economic policy, since it may generate an almost fatalistic acceptance of 
the economic difficulties with which we are at present grappling. This idea can be useful only if it is used as 
a rational basis for grouping, and improving the description of, certain complex processes which take place 
in historical time. Some aspects of these processes recur because the impulses which generate them are 
themselves recurrent, and in the ultimate analysis they flow from major innovations. But recurrence and 
regularity are separate concepts. Regularity may be an optical illusion; and it is possible to identify other 
“long” cycles, of a different duration, as Schumpeter himself was inclined to admit. In any case, the idea is 
still valid, that there are several industrial revolutions succeeding each other over time and characterizing 
different periods of the modern age». Sylos Labini (1984b, pp. 87-88). See also Sylos Labini (1989, pp. 58-59). 
82 Sylos Labini (1984b, pp. 86-88), Sylos Labini (1993a, pp. 115-116), Sylos Labini (1989, pp. 33-36), Sylos 
Labini (1983, pp. 379-380). 
83 Sylos Labini (1984a, p. 59 of the Italian edition) (it is not translated in the English edition), Sylos Labini 
(1998a, p. 347). 
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to explain fluctuations. We now had to consider the role of the State and the unions.84 This 
was the first statement indicating Labini’s fusion of Keynes and Schumpeter. 
 
 Schumpeter does not consider in his theoretical model either the State or the trade unions, which 
Keynes on the contrary does, although only in a stylized and circumscribed way. Keynes, however, does 
not consider either the changes in productivity or innovations, which Schumpeter places at the heart of 
his analysis. As to market forms, Schumpeter is well aware of the spread of the large units of production, 
so much so that he puts forward the distinction between “competitive” and “trustified capitalism” to 
indicate the new economic system which, in his view, is tending to emerge from the concentration of the 
units of productions; however, he feels that the new market structures have not yet succeeded in 
dominating the scene and in modifying in depth the mechanism of reaction of the economic system. 
Hence, he reasons as if the traditional type of competition continued to operate fully in our days as well. 
Paradoxically Keynes’ position is the inverse one. He assumes competition, but at bottom he reasons as 
if the formation of, and changes in, price took place in non-competitive markets.85  
 
 Labini thus distinguishes three models of business cycle theories: Schumpeterian, post-
Keynesian and integrated models.86 In the Schumpeterian approach, innovation gives the 
first impetus to cyclical development. This impulse means increasing investment, powered 
by credit creation. The rising demand for production brings out increases in the demand 
for consumption goods too; this means rising prices and profits. When innovative 
products reach the market and firms start to return loans, prices fall, causing bankruptcy 
for the non-innovative firms, since they failed to reduce costs and acknowledge the 
changes in prices.87 
 At first glance, it might seem that this approach has nothing in common with 
Keynesian perspective.88 In fact, Keynesian models regard technology as given and prices 
as constant; moreover, the cycle is analyzed in terms of aggregates. In Keynesian models, 
the initial impulse comes from autonomous investment (generated by innovation or public 
decisions). An autonomous investment makes consumption rise and thus, via the 
multiplier, income rises too. The income increase, in turn, causes further investments via 
the accelerator. This way a spiral mechanism is created; it reinforces itself, until it breaks 
down, when full utilization of productive resources is imminent. At this point, the rate of 
increase in income tends to slow down, then fall. The decrease, first relative to the 
multiplier, becomes absolute: income falls. So, the explanation of cyclical movements, in 
this approach, is via the interaction of the multiplier and the accelerator. However, this 
interaction can generate the cycle or development, not both at the same time.89 
 Labini tried to combine the two approaches. In fact, the starting point, in his opinion, is 
the same.90 In the Keynesian models, growth comes from a specific mechanism of 
interaction in which a central role is played by a progressive and irregular increase in 
prices. This process is hinted at, although in a non-methodical way, by Schumpeter too.91 
Price stability is one of the major limitations of the Keynesian approach. But neither 
this, nor the Schumpeterian model, take account of the State, unions, foreign demand or 
imports. To build up an integrated model, three corrections need to be made. 
                                                 
84 Sylos Labini (1984b, pp. 93-94). 
85 Sylos Labini 1984b, p. 89. 
86 Sylos Labini (1984b, pp. 86-100). 
87 Sylos Labini (1984b, pp. 90-91). 
88 Sylos Labini (1984b, p. 91). 
89 Sylos Labini (1984b, pp. 90-91). See also Sylos Labini (1993a, p. 121). 
90 Sylos Labini (1984b, p. 91). 
91 Sylos Labini (1984b, p. 91). 
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 The first concerns market theory. Labini says we have to distinguish between the sector 
of industrial products and the branch of raw materials. The link between prices and direct 
costs regards industrial prices only, while for raw materials market competition rules are 
valid. Moreover, Labini tries to apply the Schumpeterian view to an oligopolistic system, 
while Schumpeter, though saying oligopoly is reality, elaborates a model for a competitive 
system. Specifically, Labini states that, in the new reality, the “new” does not merely add 
to the “old,” but replaces it, and the volume of investment may even fail to rise, though 
the productivity of production factors rises.92 
 The second correction deals with purchasing power. Price variations are not 
proportional to those regarding salaries, because of changes in productivity. Moreover, 
they are not proportional in the price system in itself, because of innovations (Schumpeter) 
and because different price categories are ruled by different mechanisms. Thus, changes in 
prices cause variations in the way income is distributed between different production 
factors. The profit share changes too, and this mutation affects investment decisions, 
acting on cyclical development.93 
 The last correction concerns productivity. An increase in labor productivity is one of 
the most important effects of innovations. It is a frequent, but not necessary, effect. In fact, 
in Labini’s opinion, it is possible to talk about such an increase only in the case of 
innovations regarding production processes, not in the case of new products.94 
 Schumpeter pays attention to autonomous innovations, neglecting innovations 
resulting from an increase in demand.95 If we observe changes in productivity, it can be 
seen that productivity increases constantly, though at varying rates. This means that the 
smaller innovations—generated by expansion of the market and by a rise in the relative 
cost of labor—have, in the aggregate, the most weight. That is to say, in each historical 
period, the big innovations create impulses and requirements for development, while the 
development, once activated, is powered by the flow of small innovations.96 
 In Labini’s opinion, the link between the increase in aggregate demand and the 
incentives created by the flow of small innovations is, together with the central role of 
autonomous investments, the bridge between Schumpeter and Keynes. Unlike Keynes, 
Labini focuses not only on aggregate demand, but also on the demand of each sector. 
However, Labini states that the faster the rise in aggregate demand, the faster the rise in 
sector demand. In this context, the dynamics of aggregate demand and factors that affect 
movements in the demand of every consumption good97 need to be studied.  
 In this integrated model, Labini introduces the hypothesis that, when certain 
conditions change, fundamental equations change too. This modification stands on the 
following set of assumptions. 
 
1) During the downswing, families save less, trying not to reduce consumption. Thus, in 
this phase the consumption/income ratio increases. 
 
2) Capital stock rises with investments, so the limit to the income increase rises too. 
                                                 
92 Sylos Labini (1956, pp. 147-148). See also Sylos Labini (1968). 
93 Sylos Labini (1984b, pp. 93-94). 
94 Sylos Labini (1984b, p. 94). 
95 Sylos Labini (1984b, p. 94) and Sylos Labini (1992, p. 14). 
96 Sylos Labini (1984b, p. 94) and Sylos Labini (1983, p. 385). 
97 Sylos Labini (1984b, p. 94). 
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3) The income increase is generated by the increase in investment. However, when these 
investments tend toward zero (on account of the limitation mentioned above), they 
decrease and favorable conditions come about for autonomous investments (i.e. low 
interest rates).98 
 
 According to Labini, after 2–3 years, an increase in investment (the real starting point 
of the cycle) produces an increase in production capacity and in the productivity of 
production factors (labor as well). Via the multiplier, these influence aggregate demand. 
Total demand and supply increase, on account of the increasing utilization of production 
capacity. The rapid increase in demand for labor and raw materials during the upswing, 
pushes up labor costs and the prices of raw materials, raising direct costs and 
consumption prices. But prices increase slower than costs, so profits fall. The rise in labor 
costs stimulates technological investments, but slowing employment generates a fall in 
total consumption. Thus we can say, according to Labini, that: 
 
 when investments made to increase production capacity stop, the increase in supply is 
rapid; 
 
 when investments made to cut labor costs stop, the productivity increase is rapid, but 
consumption slows down.99 
 
 These assumptions lead to a general slowing of the economy, caused by the conflict 
between accelerating supply and decelerating demand. The origin of this situation is a 
decline in profits generated by increasing labor costs. As profits drive investment, falling 
profits mean falling investment and thus falling total demand. Thus, the upper turning 
point is caused by falling profits related to contracting demand. In Labini’s vision, the 
upswing lasts as long as the investment gestation period lasts, two or three years. The 
subsequent contraction will last at least one year: the time required to rebuild profit 
margins by (partially) restructuring the fixed capital stock.100 
 The recovery can be achieved by autonomous innovations, public expenditure, foreign 
demand, or lowering salaries. The last method has been impossible since after the Second 
World War. Labini adds, following Keynes, that in the short run we only have one 
possibility: public expenditure.101 
 Monetary policy is also important, especially during the economic revival. A new 
increase in total demand may be created by autonomous investments, public expenditure 
or foreign demand. In all these cases, additional money is needed, because a reduction in 
the money supply/total production ratio would bring about a rise in the interest rate, 
stopping the recovery. If demand is driven by deficit spending, the central bank has to 
increase the basic monetary aggregate (Keynes considers this case). If the recovery is 
driven instead by private investments, the increase in the money supply may derive from 
                                                 
98 Sylos Labini (1993a, pp. 121-122). 
99 Sylos Labini (1993a, pp. 122-123). 
100 Sylos Labini (1993a, p. 123). 
101 Sylos Labini (1993a, p. 124). We have to recall that even Hayek admits the importance of public 
expenditure for a policy of supplementing demand, during the later half of the declining phase of the cycle. 
See Hayek (1939, p. 63). 
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an increase in bank’s deposits on demand (Schumpeter emphasizes this fact).102 
 This is the business cycle theory elaborated by Paolo Sylos Labini. It is a useful 
interpretative instrument, constructed on the work of Marx, Schumpeter and Keynes.103 
 
  
                                                 
102 Sylos Labini (1993a, p. 125). 
103 An analytical illustration of this theory is presented by the author in Sylos Labini (1956), pp. 103-187) and 
Sylos Labini (1993a, pp. 131-135). A detailed analytical and empirical model is elaborated in connection with 
the Italian economy: see Sylos Labini (1992, pp. 251-305) and Sylos Labini (2004, pp. 95-100). 
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APPENDIX – THE CONTENT OF THE UNPUBLISHED NOTES104 
 
by Paolo Sylos Labini 
 
 
I.1. Types of innovations. -2. Growth and evolution. -3. Prosperity and welfare.  
II.1. The quantity of money. -2. Saving and the theoretical model. -3. Cheap money and 
unemployment. -4. Mortgages. -5. “Hungry forties”.  
III.1. On the rate of interest. -2. On the life of the firms. -3. An example of “resistance to the 
new”. 
 
 I.1. Among the examples of innovations you mention the opening up of new sources of 
supply and that of new markets.  
 Does the opening up of new sources of supply necessarily imply a new production 
function? Is it not possible to conceive, for instance, the opening up of new lands with the 
same degree of fertility than the already cultivated ones, so that the production might be 
carried out with exactly the same coefficients? 
 And does the opening up of new markets mean innovation in any case? We may 
conceive that the firms expand their production within the same production functions (at 
decreasing average costs if there are “lumpy factors”). The opening up of new markets 
might allow for the possibility of applying new technical methods, of setting up new 
production functions; in this case the application of these new methods would be really 
the innovation. 
 
 I.2. In your Business Cycles and in other works of yours I have noticed the opposition: 
Growth vs. Evolution, the former excluding, the latter including, - and being originated by 
- innovations. 
 You designate as “Growth” the changes in population and in the sum of total saving 
plus accumulation” (p. 83). And you say that “the effects of Growth are... capable of being 
currently absorbed... hence, cannot by themselves create the alternation of booms and 
depressions we observe” (p. 84). This point of view seems to me acceptable. 
 But I ask myself: is a growth logically conceivable without changes in production 
functions? 
 I am still reflecting on this point. 
 It seems to me that “Growth” is conceivable without innovations only in the 
(exceptional) case of opening up of new lands with the same degree of fertility than the 
cultivated ones and with which it is possible to produce with the same coefficients. But 
without free lands “Growth” without innovations does not seem to me possible. The 
population cannot increase indefinitely without a corresponding increase in the 
“subsistencies”’; and the real capital cannot increase indefinitely without increase in the 
production of raw materials. It seems to me that neither Böhm-Bawerk’s concept of the 
lengthening of production period nor the hypothesis of an increase of capital per man-
hour could remove the doubt. I think that it is really “impossible to assume that there” is 
“no decreasing-return influence (defined with respect to given production functions and 
invariant fertility of soil) to overcome” (p. 237). I think that ever in order to expand 
production at constant average costs (in the long run at least) innovations are necessary. 
                                                 
104 We have published here the original content of the notes. Any language errors are in the original version. 
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 You make a distinction between innovations that entail, and innovations that do not 
entail, construction of New Plant requiring non negligible time and outlay (p. 93), stating 
that in your analysis you will restrict yourself to the first type of innovation. Would not be 
of some help to introduce a distinction of this kind in connection with the question of 
“Growth”? 
 If it were possible to define all the innovations in terms of money costs, we might 
distinguish between innovations that allow to expand production at constant average 
costs and innovations that bring about a diminution of average costs. (The main difficulty, 
of course, arise in the case of innovations consisting in the supply of new commodities; 
theoretically, perhaps, we might compare the average cost of the new commodity with 
that of the “nearest” old commodity, namely with the cost of the commodity that satisfies 
a similar want and that is likely to suffer directly and immediately from the competition of 
the new commodity). 
 The innovations of the first type, those which simply enable the firms to neutralize 
“Law” of diminishing returns, might be absorbed without considerable trouble; they, 
plausibly, might be currently adopted by the existing firms and anyway might not give 
rise to the “competition-down” process. On the contrary, the innovations that not only 
neutralize the “Law” of decreasing returns, but bring about a diminution of the cost of 
production (of the “normal value”), might give rise, sooner or later, to the competing-
down process and, possibly, to the cycle in your sense.  
 
 A question related to the problem of “Growth” is that of the effects of credit creation. 
Namely, if we take into account “Growth”, the credit creation does not imply necessarily 
(or not proportionately) increase of price level. The case of credit creation without increase 
of prices might be linked with the possibility you mention (p. 111, footnote) of an 
hypotetical shift of factors of production. 
 If an economic system showed “Growth” only, a continuous credit creation would be 
conceivable without changes in the price level. But in this case it would be necessary to see 
whether credit creation itself would be conceivable; as credit creation necessarily implies 
the payment of interest, it would not be conceivable, if we admit that interest arises from 
profit and profit arises form reduction of costs (in a broad sense). 
 
 I.3. I agree that (cyclical) prosperity is not synonymous with welfare; but from your 
considerations one draws the impression that, in a sense, an inverted relation exists105. It is 
true that, in this kind of statements, you put always many important qualifications (the 
most important is that concerning the “deep depressions”); but, when we consider the 
negative phases of the long waves the qualifications, perhaps, may appear more important 
                                                 
105 An amusing remark. Certainly, you remember the witty critical observation of Dr. Lange, who says: 
 “Even Marx in all his belief that the ideas of an epoch are those which correspond to the interes of the 
ruling class would not have thought that the capitalist entrepreneurs have such amazing semantic power, 
i.e., the power to make people call ‘prosperity’ the period in which they are worse off merely because it is 
one of prosperity for the entrepreneurs and capitalistis”. 
 Yet, what “even Marx would not have thought”, has been publicly mantained (although with various 
qualifications) by Alfred Marshall, who, answering in 1886 to the questions circulated by the Royal 
Commission on the Depression, worte: 
 “When prices are ascending the improvement is thought to be greater than it really is, because general 
opinion with regard to the prosperity of the country is much influenced by the authority of manufactures 
and merchants. These judge by their own experience...” [Sylos Labini’s footnote]. 
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than the statements. 
 You say, if I remember correctly, that, in general, Democracy works better in periods of 
declining prices. There are two considerations that leave doubtful on this point: the effort 
of a non negligible part of the capitalist classes to maintain their vanishing incomes 
through “artificial” (mainly political) monopolistic barriers; and the effort of the working 
classes to maintain the employment and to contrast wage cuts. For these and similar 
reasons (but not taking into account evolutionary changes) one might think that social 
struggles should rather increase during the periods of falling prices, above all, of course, 
during the depressions occurring in these periods. 
 There are some connections between this question and that of the stagnation and the 
decline of “capitalism”.  
 You say that “capitalism produces by its mere working a social atmosphere... that is 
hostile to it, and this atmosphere, in turn, produces policies which do not allow it to 
function”. 
You stress, among the other things, the declining importance of the function of 
entrepreneur in a “trustified” capitalism, the “crumbling of the protective walls” and the 
anticapitalist attitude of many “intellectuals”. 
 I hope to have the opportunity to speak with you about two points related to this 
matter. Here I only indicate these points. 
 First, the increasing economical and political power of the working classes and, second, 
the increasing relative importance of the industrial sector in the capitalist societies. 
 The second point might give rise to the idea that, given the characteristics of the 
“industrial” activities, the gravity of the problem of unemployment tends necessarily to 
grow in every depression. Perhaps, it would be possible to speak of a rising “result trend” 
of unemployment. 
 The increasing economical and political power of the working classes also result from 
the cyclical evolution (increase of real income and technical and economical possibility of 
organizing powerful unions). 
 From the comparison of the two tendencies we might draw, perhaps, interesting 
considerations. We might stress, for instance, the fact that workers’ organizations are, 
during depressions, more and more able to oppose laissez faire (=bourgeois) solutions of 
the problem of unemployment and impose, directly or indirectly, policies bringing about 
structural (probably anticapitalist) modifications of the economic system. 
 
 II.1. I agree that “it is... impossible to speak of the quantity of ‘money’ in the sense in 
which we speak of the quantity of a commodity” (especially because the production of 
money, in the case of paper money, is a think completely different from the production of 
a commodity). But I wonder whether the concept of quantity of “money” is completely 
valueless or deceitful. You say that “certain claims to ‘money’ serve, within wide limits, 
the same purposes as legal tender itself”; and that one of the consequences is that “the 
distinction between velocity and quantity becomes blurred”. I am not convinced of this. 
The point of view of Wicksell (shared, if I remember correctly, by Rist) seems to me to be 
unsound. The banks’ reserves (even if consisting of gold coins) may be not considered as 
money, because they are not used as money; if, during emergencies of periods of panic, 
they come back into circulation, they become again money, but in this case they are no 
longer reserves. And if we refer ourselves to a given moment, the distinction between 
velocity and quantity (theoretically at least) seems to me clear: if there are 100 individuals 
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and 100 bank notes, each individual, in a given moment, can hold (and not simply expect) 
one bank note and build up “plans” with it. I think that analogous considerations might 
apply to balances held by individuals with deposit banks. 
 
 II.2. “Accumulations and saving provide the means for consolidating rather than for 
building up industrial ventures” (p. 601). I agree. Also your thesis that “saving is not a 
major factor initiating economic change” (p. 83) seems to me acceptable. 
 But the exclusion of saving from your theoretical model leaves me doubtful. 
 If I have understood correctly, your considerations about the consolidation function of 
saving apply mainly to saving used to buy stocks and bonds (p. 588). 
What about saving lent to banks? To a considerable extent this saving is used by banks to 
build up their reserves. Therefore the question arises: is the cyclical process conceivable 
without the banks’ reserves? 
 It seems to me that recovery and prosperity can, recession and depression cannot, be 
conceived without banks’ reserves. In other words, the process of “autodeflation” does not 
exaust the relations between banks and firms during the negative phases of the cycles, 
because there are bankruptcies and anyway insolvencies. Deposit banks find themselves 
with “deposits” that, having been born simultaneously as credits and debts, become only 
debts. The banks can face (and eventually eliminate) this disequilibrium if only they have 
adequate reserves. From this point of view, saving may appear as a condition of the very 
life of banks. More generally, in the cyclical process saving may appear as an element 
necessary for the liquidation of the “old firms” and therefore may appear as a necessary 
integration of the process of “autodeflation”. If saving is not sufficient to liquidate the “old 
firms’’, consequences may follow very important for the structure of the economic system. 
 These considerations might perhaps have also to do with the question of the “result 
trend” of prices. Because, if bankruptcies and insolvencies of firms are considerable and 
the banks’ reserves are insufficient to face the claims of the creditors; and if the bank of 
issue, on behalf of the government and protected by a declaration of inconvertibility of its 
notes (or only by a depreciation of them in terms of gold), come to rescue of the deposit 
banks granting its notes to them, at the end of the cycle the total quantity of “money” 
might result so much increased as to originate a price level higher than that existing 
during the previous “neighbourhood of equilibrium”. This possibility (it is only a 
possibility, of course) may be conceived even in relation to periods so long as to include 
more than one “Kondratieff”. 
 
 In Italy, for instance, during the seventy years preceding the second world war, we 
hand an increasing trend of prices; and this, I think, not only for reasons related to 
“unproductive” expenses of the state (e.g., war expenses), but also for “cyclical” reasons 
(rescuing of banks and firms operated, during depression, by the bank – or banks – of 
issue on behalf of the state), though undoubtly the cyclical process in Italy has been, to a 
variable but never negligible extent, the result of the impact of the “cycles” of more 
capitalist countries. During the same period the increase of per capita income, which has 
been very small, may be attributed to the fact that the increase of the wage level has been a 
little higher than the increase of the price level. In other words, the increase in the 
standard of living in Italy took place through an increase in wages greater than the 
increase in prices, instead of a decrease in prices without a decrease in wages. 
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 II.3. “The prevailing cheapness of money will give them a slant towards 
mechanization...” (p. 954; also: p. 995). 
 This point is not clear to me. The possibility, for firms, to obtain “money” more cheaply 
should give them a slat to increase the demand of all the factors of production, labour 
included. If the firms prefer to buy more machinery and less personal services, the choice 
would seem to me to be based on the comparison of the prices of the various factors of 
production and not on the cheapness of money. (E non è detto che i prestiti a lunga 
scadenza servano solo a finanziare acquisti di macchinari e quelli a breve di capitale 
circolante. Può darsi che un’impresa si carichi di debiti a breve che via via rinnova ed anzi 
accresce, per pagare salari totali, che aumentano; poi consolida il debito emettendo azioni 
o obbligazioni a lunga scadenza. Viceversa, l’impresa può far debiti a breve che rinnova ed 
accresce per acquistare macchinari. Si può dire che questi sono casi “patologici”, 
“anormali”. Può darsi, ma il principio cade). 
 
 II.4. More than once I found in your Business Cycles statements that could give rise to 
the idea that mortgages contracted for the purpose of buying lands are necessarily 
unproductive. If mortgages are contracted in periods of rising prices and, moreover, with 
the purpose of ripening gains due to the increasing land values rather than harvests, what 
you say is unquestionable. But we may think that an entrepreneur, possessing no factors 
of production and needing agricultural land in order to actuate an innovation, may 
acquire a piece of land with a mortgage loan. In this case, it seems to me, that mortgage 
loan may come into category of “productive” loans. 
 
 II.5. As a historical indication of the “shift” of factors towards the production of 
producers’ good at the beginning of the (long) cycle, you mention more than once the 
“hungry forties” (p. 142, 503, 576). But I wonder whether those “hungry forties” may be 
rather attributed to a slackening of the agricultural production consequential to the long 
preceding agricultural depression, coupled with a series of poor or bad harvests. If the 
“shift” was one of the factors determining that situation, it was not, I think, a major one. 
(In general, I think that, taking into account “Growth”, the “hypotetical” shift may be 
considered – especially in relation to the long waves – more important than the “actual” 
one.) 
 
 III.1. I have found an interesting consideration in a paper by F. Knight about the 
behaviour of the rate of interest during the business cycle (interest does not become zero 
principally because “men do not expect the depression last forever”; Rev. of Ec. St., 1941, 
n. 2). 
 
 III.2. “Quantitative information about the life span of individual firms and analysis 
explanatory of their careers and their age distribution are among our most urgent 
desiderata” (p. 95, footnote). 
 Perhaps the following list of Italian statistical papers may be of some interest to you. (I 
had the list from the courtesy of Prof. G. Capodaglio.) 
 F. Vinci, La vita delle società per azioni, Rivista delle società per azioni, 1918, p. 316. 
G. Lasorsa, Indagini sulla mortalità delle società per azioni, Rivista di Politica economica, 
1936, p. 527. 
 G. Capodaglio, Storia di un investimento di capitale. La società italiana per le strade 
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ferrate meridionali (1862-1937), Milano, Bietti, 1939 (p. 60: Tavola di sopravvivenza delle 
società italiane per azioni) 
 
 III.3 The “Legge sulla disciplina dei nuovi impianti industriali” of 1933 (January, 13) 
affords a good example of legalized and “planned” resistance to the “new” in a fascist 
state. According to this law, every project of new industrial plant or of enlargement of the 
existing ones had to be examined and approved by the competent corporazione, i.e., 
practically, by the representatives of the already operating firms. The information about 
the application of the law and, more broadly, the analysis of the Italian Industrial sector 
during the decade preceding the second world war might be interesting perhaps, also in 
connection of the theoretical question of “Growth” and of what you call cyclical evolution. 
(L. Einaudi, La corporazione aperta, Riforma sociale, 1934, n. 2, p. 134; A. Santarelli, Dati e 
considerazioni intorno alla disciplina corporativa delle nuove iniziative industriali, Rivista 
internazionale di scienze sociali, 1941, n. 1, p. 48; L. Einaudi, Intorno alla disciplina degli 
impianti industriali, Giornale degli economisti, 1941, n. 7-8, p. 458; G. Demaria, Il 
problema industriale italiano, Giornale degli economisti, n. 9-10, 1941.). 
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